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Makalah ini membahas pilihan dalam metode manajemen laba di Malaysia dan 
Indonesia dengan perbandingan empiris. Metode manajemen laba adalah kegiatan 
nyata dan akrual. Kecenderungan untuk perlindungan investor tinggi digunakan 
manajemen laba dengan metode kegiatan nyata. Malaysia adalah perlindungan 
investor tinggi dan Indonesia adalah perlindungan investor yang lebih rendah. 
Makalah ini membahas perbedaan sistematis dalam manajemen laba melalui 
aktivitas nyata di negara Malaysia dan Indonesia. Kami mengusulkan argumen 
diperiksa bahwa dalam ekonomi dengan perlindungan investor tinggi, manajer lebih 
memilih untuk mengelola laba melalui manipulasi aktivitas nyata daripada melalui 
manipulasi akrual karena manipulasi akrual lebih mungkin untuk menarik auditor 
atau pengawasan regulator daripada keputusan-keputusan tentang harga dan 
produksi. Temuan kami ini konsisten dengan prediksi kita. Meskipun dalam ekonomi 
dengan perlindungan investor tinggi, manajer masih memiliki keleluasaan lebih besar 
dalam mengelola pendapatan melalui kegiatan nyata daripada manipulasi akrual. 
 
Kata kunci: manajemen laba, manipulasi aktivitas nyata, perlindungan 
          investor 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on investor protection as a significant determinant of earnings 
management activity in Malaysia and Indonesia. Leuz (2003) argues that strong and wel-
enforced outsider rights limit insiders’ acquisition of private control benefits, and 
consequently, mitigate insiders’ incentives to manage accounting earnings because they have 
litle to conceal from outsiders. This insight suggests that the pervasiveness of earnings 
management is increasing in private control benefits and decreasing in outside investor 
protection in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
This study focuses in Malaysia and Indonesia countries to make contributing to the 
future of our society. So, in Malaysia and Indonesia by expanding its range of the 
responsibilities through legal enforcement too. Investor protection in order to enhance 
economic development, mutual understanding and cooperation in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Malaysia and Indonesia provide a useful seting for testing the importance of investor 
protection. Malaysis have accounting standards that are generaly viewed as high-quality, but 
not Indonesia. Indonesia have institutional structures that give preparers incentives to issue 
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low-quality financial reports. Reporting quality of earnings ultimately is determined by the 
underlying economic and political factors influencing managers’ and auditors’ incentives, 
and not by accounting standards per se. Shareholder litigation is an important mechanism to 
enforce high quality financial reporting—particularly timely loss recognition—in common-
law countries. 
While prior research has provided evidence on managers’ incentives for earnings 
management and earnings management more aggressive in countries with low legal 
enforcement but there is relatively litle evidence on what manager’s methods to manage 
earnings in diferent legal environment. In addition, prior research used accrual manipulation 
to measure earnings management but actualy managers have flexibility to manage earnings 
with accrual manipulation, real activities manipulation or classification shifting. This paper 
atempts to provide evidence that investor protection determines manager’s choices between 
real activities manipulation versus accrual manipulation when they have the flexibility to 
engage both in Malaysia and Indonesia. To measure earnings management through real 
activity manipulation we use Roychowdhury’s model in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Firstly, this study is useful to identify factors that afect method choice by manager to 
manage earnings in Malaysia and Indonesia. Secondly, this study gives our understanding to 
evaluate efectiveness of legal enforcement in protect outsider (minority) investor when 
manager have flexibility to choose earnings management method in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Prior research documents greater financial transparency in countries with stronger 
investor protection regimes (Bhatacharya et al. 2003; Bushman et al. 2004), and there is 
evidence that earnings are less managed and in these countries (e.g., Bal et al. 2000; Hung 
2000; Leuz et al. 2003). Leuz finds that earnings management is more pervasive in countries 
where the legal protection of outside investors is weak, because in these countries insiders 
enjoy greater private control benefits and hence have stronger incentives to manipulate firm 
performance. 
Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence that managers in US firms manipulate earnings 
through real activity. Roychowdhury finds evidence suggesting price discounts to temporarily 
increase sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of 
discretionary expenditures are used to improve reported margins. This is contrary to Leuz’s 
finding that in countries with strong legal protection, managers are less aggressive to manage 
earnings. We argue that in strong legal enforcement economies, managers prefer to manage 
earnings through real activity manipulation rather than through accrual manipulation. 
The manipulation of real activity potentialy reduces firm value. Real activities 
manipulation can reduce firm value because actions taken in the curent period to increase 
earnings can have a negative efect on cash flows in future periods. For example, aggressive 
price discounts to increase sales volumes and meet some short-term earnings target can lead 
customers to expect such discounts in future periods as wel. This can imply lower margins 
on future sales. Overproduction generates excess inventories that have to be sold in 
subsequent periods and imposes greater inventory holding costs on the company. There is 
evidence that managers manipulate real activity in strong investor protection country 
(Roychowdhury 2006). So the purpose of this study is to examine whether legal systems 
afect the choice of earnings management methods. 
According to surveys conducted by Bruns and Merchant (1990) and Graham et al. 
(2005), financial executives indicate a greater wilingness to manipulate earnings through real 
activities rather than accruals. There are at least two possible reasons for this. Firstly, accrual 
manipulation is more likely to draw auditor or regulator scrutiny than real decisions about 
pricing and production. Secondly, relying on accrual manipulation alone entails a risk. The 
realized year-end shortfal between un-manipulated earnings and the desired threshold can 
exceed the amount by which it is possible to manipulate accruals. If that happens, and 
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reported income fals below the threshold, real activities cannot be manipulated at year-end. 
So, we argued that in countries with high investor protection, managers don’t have 
discretionary to manage earnings through accrual manipulation because accrual manipulation 
is easily to detect. Managers wil prefer to manage earnings through real activities. 
The protection of investor rights, particularly outside investors, is important in 
creating economic incentives for the development of financial markets (Hart, 1995). More 
developed financial markets create greater external financing opportunities for firms because 
legal systems protect investors by confering on them rights to discipline insiders (e.g., to 
replace managers), as wel as by enforcing contracts designed to limit insiders’ private 
control benefits (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Nenova, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Dyck and 
Zingales, 2002).2 Thus, legal systems protecting outside investors reduce insiders’ need to 
conceal their activities. 
The protection of investor rights, particularly outside investors, is important in 
creating economic incentives for the development of financial markets (Hart, 1995). More 
developed financial markets create greater external financing opportunities for firms because 
legal systems protect investors by confering on them rights to discipline insiders (e.g., to 
replace managers), as wel as by enforcing contracts designed to limit insiders’ private 
control benefits (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Nenova, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; Dyck and 
Zingales, 2002).2 Thus, legal systems protecting outside investors reduce insiders’ need to 
conceal their activities. 
Legal systems protect investors by confering on them rights to discipline insiders 
(e.g., to replace managers), as wel as by enforcing contracts designed to limit insiders’ 
private control benefits (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Nenova, 2000; Claessens et al., 2002; 
Dyck and Zingales, 2002).2 As a result, legal systems that efectively protect outside 
investors reduce insiders’ need to conceal their activities. Earnings management can be 
defined as non-neutral financial reporting in which managers intervene intentionaly in the 
financial reporting process to produce some private gain (Schipper 1989). Managers can 
intervene by modifying how they interpret financial accounting standards and accounting 
data, or by timing or structuring transactions (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
Prior accounting research has documented three main methods of earnings 
management. The most commonly studied method is accrual management (e.g., Healy 1985; 
Jones 1991; McNichols and Wilson 1988; Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998; Philips et al. 
2003). A second type of earnings management can occur through the manipulation of real 
activities, such as providing price discounts to increase sales and cuting discretionary 
expenditures, to manage earnings (e.g., Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 
1998). Third type of earnings management tools is the misclassification of items within the 
income statement. 
Bruns and Merchant (1990) and Graham et al. (2005), indicate that financial 
executives have greater wilingness to manipulate earnings through real activities rather than 
accruals. There are at least two possible reasons for this. Firstly, accrual manipulation is more 
likely to draw auditor or regulator scrutiny than real decisions about pricing and production 
(Dechow, Sloan dan Sweeney 1996). Secondly, relying on accrual manipulation alone entails 
a risk. The realized year-end shortfal between un-manipulated earnings and the desired 
threshold can exceed the amount by which it is possible to manipulate accruals. If that 
happens, and reported income fals below the threshold, real activities cannot be manipulated 
at year-end. 
 A number of studies discuss the possibility that managerial intervention in the 
reporting of financial statement process can occur not only via accounting estimates and 
methods, but also through operational decisions. Manipulation by management through real 
activities is less likely to draw auditor or regulator scrutiny. In contrast accrual manipulation 
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is more easily to detect. We therefore propose that earnings management through accrual 
manipulation is less pervasive in countries where the legal protection of outside investors is 
strong, because in these countries legal system protect investor by conferring on them right to 
discipline insider. 
There is evidence that manager in US firms manipulate earnings through real activity 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). US firms are characterized by large stock markets, low ownership 
concentration, extensive outsider rights, high disclosure, and strong legal enforcement. Leuz 
(2003) finds that in countries with strong legal protection, managers are less aggressive to 
manage earnings through accrual manipulation. So we argue that in strong legal enforcement 
economies, managers prefer to manage earnings through real activity manipulation rather 
than accrual manipulation. Accrual manipulation is more easily to detect, in other hand, real 
activities manipulation can be subjective, auditors might be limited in their ability to verify 
the appropriate classification. In countries with low legal enforcement, managers have great 
discretionary to manage earnings with both accrual manipulation and real activity 
manipulation. In hypothesis 2 we argue that when legal enforcement strong, managers prefer 
to manage earnings through sales manipulation, reduce discretionary expenses reduction and 
production increases rather than accrual manipulation. 
To detect real activities manipulation we investigate paterns in CFO and production 
costs folowing Roychowdhury (2006). Sales manipulation is defined as managers’ atempts 
to temporarily increase sales during the year by offering price discounts or more lenient credit 
terms. The cash inflow per sale, net of discounts, from these additional sales is lower as 
margins decline. The lower margin due to the price discounts causes production costs relative 
to sales to be abnormaly high. These are essentialy price discounts and lead to lower cash 
inflow over the life of the sales, as long as suppliers to the firm do not ofer matching 
discounts on firm inputs. In general, sales management activities to lead to lower current-
period CFO and higher production costs than what is normal given the sales level. 
Ha: There is negative relationship between investor protection and abnormaly cash flow 
from operation. After controling for sales level, firms in countries with high investor 




Real activities manipulation is departures from normal operational practices, 
motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain 
financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Folowing Roychowdhury (2006), normal cash flow from operations is a linear 
function of sales and change in sales in the curent period. To estimate the model, we run the 
folowing cross-sectional regression: 
 
CFOt /At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (St/At-1) + α3 (ΔSt / A t-1) + εt ………………. (1) 
 
where At is the total assets at the end of period t, St the sales during period t and ΔSt = St – 
St-1. For every firm-year, abnormal cash flow from operations is the actual CFO minus the 
‘normal’ CFO calculated using estimated coeficients from the coresponding industry year 
model and the firm-year’s sales and lagged assets. 
Abnormal level = Actual level – Normal Level. 
The model for normal COGS is estimated as: 
COGSt /At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (St/At-1) + εt 
The model for ‘normal’ inventory growth using the folowing regression: 
ΔINVt /At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (ΔSt / A t-1) ++ α3 (ΔSt-1 / A t-1) εt 
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where ΔINVt is the change in inventory in period t. 
Production costs as: 
PRODt = COGSt+ ΔINVt. 
Using (2) and (3), normal production costs from the folowing industry-year regression: 
PRODt /At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (ΔSt/At-1) + α3 (ΔSt / A t-1) + α4 (ΔSt-1 / A t-1) εt 
Discretionary expenses be expressed as a linear function of contemporaneous sales, similar to 
COGS. 
The relevant regression would then be: 
DISEXPt /At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (St-1/At-1) + εt 
where DISEXPt is discretionary expenses in period t. Discretionary expenses as DisExp = 
R&D + Advertising + SG&A expenses 
We begin with a descriptive country cluster analysis, which groups countries with 
similar legal and institutional characteristics. We use multiple investor protection measures 
are: 
1. Outside Investor Right; is an aggregate measure of minority shareholder rights and ranges 
from zero to five.  
2. Disclosure requirements. 
3. Important of equity market; is measured by the mean rank across three variables used in La 
Porta et al. (1997). Each variable is ranked such that higher scores indicate a greater 
importance of the stock market. 
4. Legal enforcement; is measured as the mean score across three legal variables used in La 
Porta et al (1998). Three variables range from 0 to 10. 
Cluster analysis is based on four measurement of investor protection. Then we 
compare score earnings management between clusters. We use accrual manipulation and real 
activities to measure earnings management activities. 
 
To test Ha, we use model: 
Model : AB_CFO = β0 + β1 LAW + β2 OUTSIDE_RIGHT + β3 DIS_REQ + β4LEG_ENF 
+ β5 IM + eit ………………………………………………….... (2) 
where: 
AB_CFO = abnormal cash flow 
INVPRO = proxies of investor protection, measured six ways: 
1. Outside_Right = outside investor right 
2. DIS_REQ = index of disclosure requirement 
3. LEG_ENF = legal enforcement. 
4. IM = Important of equity market. 
Because abnormal cash flow, discretionary expenses and production cost are more 
aggressive in suspect firm (firm close to zero earnings), we conduct sensitivity analysis to 
regress model 1 and 2 in ful sample (suspect & non suspect firm). 
 
RESULTS 
Our data obtained from OSIRIS database, which contains financial data from annual reports 
of publicly traded around the world. Only industrial companies are included in empirical 
analysis. Each firm must have income statement and balance sheet information for estimation 
period. The final sample consists of 5,931 firm-year observations, across Malaysia and 
Indonesia countries for fiscal years 2003-2007. 
Table 1 panel A presents the number of firm-year observation per country as wel as 
descriptive statistic for three individual earnings management measure. Panel B present 
institutional characteristics of each country 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for earnings management and institutional characteristics 
Panel A. Country score for earnings management measures 
Countries Firm-Years Abn CFO Abn Prod Cost 
Malaysia 792 0,0315 -0,0002 
Indonesia 129 0.0000 0.0000 















Malaysia 4 7.7 25.3 76 1 
Indonesia 2 2.9 4.7 na 3 
 
Panel A of table 1 provides descriptive statistics for two individual earnings management 
measures. The two individual earnings management measures exhibit striking diferences 
across countries. The statistics of the mean abnormal CFO and abnormal production cost 
show that earnings management with real activity manipulation aggressive in economies with 
high investor protection such as Malaysia compared to in economies with low investor 
protection such as Indonesia. 
Result Earnings management with real activities manipulation 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics comparing suspect firm-year to the ful sample. Firms 
that just meet the zero earnings (suspect firm) are probably try to meet the zero target 
earnings through real activities manipulation. Suspect firm-years have a lower mean of 
abnormal low CFO than non suspect firm (-0.0031 versus 0.0023). Mean of abnormal 
production cost is higher for suspect firm compared to non suspect firms (0.1388 versus -
0.0074). 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics comparing suspect firm-year to rest of the sample 
 Suspect firm 
year 
Non suspect firm Rest of the 
sample 
Ful sample 5,931 firm-years with 273 suspect firm-year 
 means means means 
Net Income/ TA 0,0029 0,0378 0,362 
Abn CFO -0,0031 0,0023 0,0021 
Abn Prod 0,1388 -0,0074 -0,0006 
 
Estimation model 
Table 3 reports the regression coeficients for some of the key regression used to estimate 
‘normal level’. We estimate using the entire sample of 5,931 firm-years. The coeficient 
generaly as predicted by Roychowdhury (2006). The coeficient of CFO on sales change 
actualy positive, for al country, and marginaly significant, indicating that conditional on 
contemporaneous sales, a higher change in sales implies higher CFO. 
Table 3 Model Parameters 
 Indonesia Malaysia 
 CFOt/At-1 Prodt/At-1 CFOt/At-1 Prodt/At-1 
intercept 0.020 -0.119 0.046 -0.072 
1/At-1 -2.35 -1.54 -3.36 -8.14 
St/At-1 0.030 0.870 -0.003 0.874 
∆St/At-1 0.000 0.001 0.088 0.161 
∆St-1/At-1  -0.023  -0.079 
Adj R2 0.035 0.896 0.058 0.923 
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*signifikan at level 10% 
This table reports the estimated parameters in folowing regression: 
CFOt /At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (St/At-1) + α3 (ΔSt / A t-1) + εt 
PRODt /At-1 = α0 + α1 (1/At-1) + α2 (ΔSt/At-1) + α3 (ΔSt / A t-1) + α4 (ΔSt-1 / A t-1) εt 
 
Comparison of suspect firm years with non suspect firm-years and the rest of sample 
 If firm-year that report profit just above zero undertake activities that adversely affect their 
CFO, then abnormal CFO for these firm-years, should be negative compared to the rest of 
sample. To test this, we estimate the folowing regression: 
Y = α + β1(Net Income) + β2(Suspect_NI) + ε ……………(4) 
The dependent variable, Y, is abnormal CFO and abnormal production cost in period t. 
Suspect_NI is an indicator variable that is set equal to 1 if firm-years belong to the earnings 
category just right of zero, and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 4: Comparison suspect firm years with non suspect sample. 














The first column in table 4 provides evidence that abnormal CFO is unusualy low for 
suspect firm years, consistent with Roychowdhury’s model. When dependent variable is CFO 
in regression (4), the coeficient on SUSPECT_NI is negative (-0,217) and significant at level 
10%. Suspect firm-years have abnormal CFO is lower than non suspect firm. 
When Y is abnormal production cost, the coeficient on SUSPECT_NI is positive 
0.142. The coeficient indicates that the mean abnormal production cost  of suspects firm-
years are larger 14.2% of assets than the mean across the rest of sample. 
To provide descriptive evidence on systematic patern in earnings management 
method across group of countries with similar institutional characteristics, we begin with 
cluster countries based on institutional characteristics (Leuz, 2003). The first cluster is 
characterized by large stock markets, low ownership concentration, extensive outsider right, 
high disclosure, and strong legal enforcement. The second and third cluster show markedly 
smaler stock markets, higher ownership concentration, weaker investor protection, lower 
disclosure level, and weaker enforcement, with the distinction that countries in the second 
cluster have significantly beter legal enforcement than countries in the third cluster. Based 
on institutional characteristics, we refer countries in the first cluster as ‘high investor 
protection economies’. The countries in the second and third cluster  
To provide descriptive evidence on the systematic paters of earnings management 
method across cluster, we use ANOVA analysis to compare aggressiveness of real activity 
manipulation and accrual manipulation across group of countries. Table 5 shows the 
diference of aggressiveness earnings management method across cluster. 
 
Table 5:Pervasiveness of earnings management by cluster 
 Cluster 1 
(high investor 
protection): 
Cluster 2 as 
variable control: 
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include Malaysia protection): 
include 
Indonesia 
Abnormal CFO -0.0075 0.0005 0.0193 
Diferent between cluster F: 8.753 Sign: 0.000  
Abnormal Production Cost 0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0757 
Diferent between cluster F: 69.443 Sign: 0.000  
 
Table 5 shows that the diferences between cluster’s average earnings management 
are statisticaly significant. High investor countries (cluster1) exhibit lower level of earnings 
management with accrual manipulation than low investor protection countries. This finding 
consistent with leuz (2003) that earnings management is expected to decrease in investor 
protection because strong protection limits insider’s ability to acquire private control benefit, 
which reduces incentives to mask firm performance. But earnings management with real 
activity management is higher in economies with strong investor protection. Real activity 
manipulation can be detected by investigate the patern of CFO and production cost. 
Deviation from normal level of CFO and Production cost are termed abnormal CFO and 
abnormal production cost. The abnormal CFO is lower in economies with high investor 
protection rather than in low investor protection. Abnormal production cost is higher in 
economies with high investor protection than in low investor protection. 
Suspect firm year more aggressive in real activity manipulation, we conduct 
sensitivity analysis to compare diferences in earnings management activity between clusters 
for suspect firm year. Thus, our results are sensitive to sample selection. 
Table 6 shows that suspect firm-years in cluster high investor protection exhibit 
abnormal low CFO and abnormal high production cost comparing to cluster  low investor 
protection. This result is consistent with previous analysis. 
In summary, the evidence earnings management with real activity manipulation is 
higher in economies with high investor protection rather than in economies with low investor 
protection. Earnings management with accrual manipulation is more aggressive in economies 
with low investor protection than in economies with high investor protection. 
 
Table 6: Pervasiveness of real activity manipulation suspect year firm by cluster 
Cluster Abnormal CFO Abnormal Production Cost 
1 (high investor protection): 
include Malaysia 
0.0130 0.0189 
2 As control variable (Japan 
and Taiwan) 
-0.0255  0.0556 
3 (low investor protection): 
include Indonesia 
0.0342 -0.2067 





The previous analysis shows that pervasiveness of earnings management with real 
activities manipulation or accrual manipulation is systematicaly related to a country’s 
institutional characteristics. A key question is which institutional factors are primary 
determinant of earnings management’s method choice. We posit that beter investor 
protection result in less earnings management with accrual manipulation because accrual 
manipulation is easy to detect and hence lower incentives to conceal firm performance with 
accrual manipulation. Our multiple regression examines the relation between earnings 
management’s method choice and investor protection. 
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Table 7: Earnings management’s method choice and investor protection 























Our multiple regression results presented at column 1 of Table 7 report regression 
analysis using abnormal accrual as the dependent variable. Results show that outside investor 
right, legal enforcement and disclosure index exhibit a significant negative association with 
abnormal accrual. The higher level of investor protection wil reduce aggressiveness earnings 
management with accrual manipulation. Al variables consistent with prediction, with the 
exception important of equity market variables. 
We atempt to provide evidence on hypothesis that investor protection is positively 
related to earnings management with real activity manipulation. We use abnormal low cash 
flow from operation and abnormal high production cost as a measure earnings management 
with real activity manipulation. The results presented in column 2 of table 6 show that 
investor protection and abnormal low CFO exhibit negative association as predicted by our 
hypothesis. Results show that legal enforcement, important equity market and disclosure 
index exhibit a significant negative association with abnormal low CFO. The higher outside 
investor right, legal enforcement and disclosure index, the lower level abnormal CFO. The 
result also support that investor protection and abnormal high production cost are positively 
related. Column 3 of table 6 show that outside investor right, legal enforcement, and 
disclosure index exhibit a significant positive association with abnormal production cost. 
In summary, the multiple regression results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
investor protection afects earnings management method choice. In economies with high 
investor protection, it is too costly to manage earnings with accrual manipulation. The cost of 
detection of accrual manipulation is high because essentialy, a manager can borow earnings 
from future periods, through the acceleration of revenues or deceleration of expenses, in 
order to improve curent earnings. The cost of detection bears a one-to-one cost of earnings 
reduction in the future; future-period earnings wil be mechanicaly lower by the net income 
that was accelerated to curent earnings. The other type of earnings management can occur 
through the manipulation of real activities, such as providing price discounts to increase sales 
and cuting discretionary expenditures, such as R&D, to manage earnings. Such actions can 
increase revenues or net income, but they are also 
costly. For example, cuting R&D spending to manage earnings may result in the loss of 
future income related to the forgone R&D opportunities. On the other hand, because the 
manipulation of real activities is not a GAAP violation, this earnings management tool is 
expected to have a lower cost of detection than accrual management. So we argue that in 
economies with high investor protection, manager prefer to use real activity manipulation to 
mask firm performance. The result of our analysis consistent with our prediction. 
 
LIMITATION AND CONCLUSION 
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This paper atempts to provide evidence does investor protection determine manager 
choice between real activities manipulation versus accrual manipulation when they have the 
flexibility to engage both in Malaysia and Indonesia. We expect that earnings management 
through accrual manipulation decreases in legal protection because when investor protection 
strong, accrual manipulation wil decrease because it is easy to detect. But in strong investor 
protection’s countries like this Malaysia, earnings management through real activities 
manipulation more aggressive because real activities manipulation can be subjective, auditor 
might be limited in their ability to verify the appropriate classification. 
This paper documents systematic diferences in the earnings management method in 
Malaysia and Indonesia countries with diferent level of investor protection. We perform 
ANOVA and multiple regression analysis to test diferences earnings management’s method 
across cluster countries based on institutional characteristics. The analysis suggest that in 
economies with high investor protection earnings management with accrual manipulation is 
lower than in economies with low investor protection in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Prior research has provided evidence on managers’ incentives for earnings 
management and earnings management more aggressive in countries with low legal 
enforcement but there is relatively litle evidence on what manager’s method  to manage 
earnings in diferent legal environment. In addition, prior research used accrual manipulation 
to measure earnings management but actualy management have flexibility to manage 
earnings with accrual manipulation, real activities manipulation or classification shifting. 
Earnings management through accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditor or 
regulator scrutiny than real decisions about pricing and production. 
In countries with weak investor protection like this Indonesia, manager have great 
discretionary to manage earnings with both accrual manipulation and real activity 
manipulation. Real activities manipulation is positively association with outside investor 
right, legal enforcement and quality of disclosure in Malaysia and Indonesia. This finding 
highlight that level of investor protection determine management’s choices on earnings 
management’s method. 
The limitation of this study in Malaysia and Indonesia: we are not include abnormal 
discretionary expenses to measure real activity manipulation because unavailable data. We 
only measure the patern of abnormal CFO and abnormal production cost. We argue that 
patern abnormal discretionary expenses have been captured at the patern of abnormal CFO 
in Malaysia and Indonesia. Reducing discretionary expenses have a positive efect on 
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